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ارزشآفرینی زنجیره تامین مالی خارجی: تعامل فساد-سرمایهگذاری. | ||
| مدیریت زنجیره ارزش راهبردی | ||
| دوره 2، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 5، مرداد 1404، صفحه 53-83 اصل مقاله (884.14 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22075/svcm.2025.38624.1037 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| مصطفی حیدری هراتمه* 1؛ رضا سعیدی2 | ||
| 1دانشیار گروه اقتصاد ، واحد نراق، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نراق، ایران | ||
| 22- دانشیار امور مالی، دانشکده بازرگانی بوش، دانشگاه کاتولیک آمریکا، واشنگتن دی سی، ۲۰۰۶۴ | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 19 مرداد 1404، تاریخ بازنگری: 14 شهریور 1404، تاریخ پذیرش: 01 مهر 1404 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| هدف تحقیق بررسی تاثیر فساد بر سرمایهگذاری خارجی در ارزشآفرینی زنجیره تامین مالی در نظر گرفته شد. روششناسی پژوهش بر مبنای اهداف پارادایمی از نوع اثباتی، بر مبنای هدف، کاربردی، براساس ماهیت دادهها از نوع کمی و از نظر نحوه گردآوری دادهها، اسنادی یا کتابخانهای است. جهت آزمون عملی و تجربی، مدل رگرسیونی سرمایهگذاری خارجی برگرفته از یک مدل اقتصادی باز و مدل رشد درونزا با تحرک سرمایه بینالمللی، ۸۸ کشور در دوره 1392 تا 1401 به عنوان نمونه تحقیق با برآوردکننده GMM تخمین زده شد. فساد در یک اقتصاد باز با انحراف در جریان و تحرک سرمایهگذاری خارجی بینالمللی، بازدهی/ نرخ بازگشت سرمایه را کاهش داده و ریسک آن را افزایش و سرمایهگذاری خارجی را تضعیف میکند. ازینرو تعامل بین فساد و سرمایهگذاری خارجی منفی و معنیدار بوده و این تصور را تایید میکند که کشورهای کمتر سرمایهگذاری خارجی شده، بیشتر در معرض اثرات سوء فساد قرار دارند. فساد میتواند زنجیره تأمین تأمین مالی خارجی را با افزایش هزینههای تراکنش (مثلاً رشوه برای تأیید وام)، تحریف تخصیص سرمایه و از بین بردن اعتماد بین ذینفعان مختل کند. سیستمهای شفاف، مانند بلاکچین، میتوانند با ارائه سوابق قابل تأیید و غیرقابل دستکاری از معاملات مالی، و کاهش فرصتهای کلاهبرداری یا پارتیبازی، فساد را کاهش دهند. تأمین مالی خارجی با ارائه سرمایه برای گسترش عملیاتی، پذیرش فناوری یا مدیریت موجودی، از سرمایهگذاری پشتیبانی میکند. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| فساد؛ سرمایهگذاری خارجی؛ زنجیره تامین مالی؛ اقتصاد باز؛ GMM | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Value Creation in the Foreign Finance Supply Chain: The Corruption-Investment Interaction. | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mostafa Heidari Haratemeh1؛ Reza Saidi2 | ||
| 1Associate Professor of the Department of Economics, Naragh Branch, Islamic Azad University, Naragh, Iran | ||
| 2Associate Professor of Finance, Busch School of Business, The Catholic University of America, Washington DC 20064 | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The aim of the research was to examine the impact of corruption on foreign investment in value creation in the financial supply chain. The research method is based on paradigmatic goals of the positive type, based on the objective, applied, based on the nature of the data, quantitative, and in terms of the method of data collection, documentary or library. For the practical and experimental test of the investment regression model derived from an open economic model and the endogenous growth model with international capital mobility, 88 countries for the period of 2013 to 2022 were considered as a research sample with the GMM estimator. Corruption in an open economy by deviating the flow and mobility of international investment, reduces the efficiency/rate of return on Foreign investment and increases its risk and weakens Foreign investment activities. Therefore, the interaction between corruption and Foreign investment is negative and significant and confirms the notion that less invested countries are more exposed to the bad effects of corruption. Because developed countries with more access to international financing are less susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption than emerging economies. Therefore, it is expected that countries with low levels of Foreign investment will have significant and significant effects of corruption, documenting the increase of uncertainty and instability. Corruption practices are formed in the absence of scientific and transparent economic principles and structures and foreign investment. Corruption can disrupt the external financing supply chain by increasing transaction costs (e.g., bribes for loan approvals), distorting capital allocation, and eroding trust among stakeholders. Transparent systems, such as blockchain, can mitigate corruption by providing verifiable, tamper-proof records of financial transactions, reducing opportunities for fraud or favoritism. External financing supports investment by providing capital for operational expansion, technology adoption, or inventory management. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Corruption, Foreign Investment, Open Economic, Finance Supply Chain, GMM | ||
| مراجع | ||
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