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Pareto-efficient situations in infinite and finite pure-strategy staircase-function games | ||
International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications | ||
مقاله 2، دوره 15، شماره 11، بهمن 2024، صفحه 29-49 اصل مقاله (614.95 K) | ||
نوع مقاله: Research Paper | ||
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22075/ijnaa.2023.26599.3361 | ||
نویسنده | ||
Vadim Romanuke* | ||
Faculty of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Polish Naval Academy, Gdynia, Poland | ||
تاریخ دریافت: 22 اسفند 1400، تاریخ پذیرش: 05 آبان 1402 | ||
چکیده | ||
A computationally tractable method is suggested for solving $N$-person games in which players’ pure strategies are staircase functions. The solution is meant to be Pareto-efficient. Owing to the payoff subinterval-wise summing, the $N$-person staircase-function game is considered as a succession of subinterval $N$-person games in which strategies are constants. In the case of a finite staircase-function game, each constant-strategy game is an $N$-dimensional-matrix game whose size is relatively far smaller to solve it in a reasonable time. It is proved that any staircase-function game has a single Pareto-efficient situation if every constant-strategy game has a single Pareto-efficient situation, and vice versa. Besides, it is proved that, whichever the staircase-function game continuity is, any Pareto-efficient situation of staircase function-strategies is a stack of successive Pareto-efficient situations in the constant-strategy games. If a staircase-function game has multiple Pareto-efficient situations, the best efficient situation is one which is the farthest from the most unprofitable payoffs. In terms of 0-1-standardization, the best efficient situation is the farthest from the zero payoffs. | ||
کلیدواژهها | ||
game theory؛ payoff functional؛ Pareto efficiency؛ staircase-function strategy؛ N-dimensional-matrix game | ||
مراجع | ||
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