Predicting agents’ investment behavior using game theory and bankruptcy problem | ||
| International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications | ||
| مقاله 11، دوره 15، شماره 2، اردیبهشت 2024، صفحه 125-132 اصل مقاله (634.2 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: Research Paper | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22075/ijnaa.2021.25335.2986 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| Fatemeh Babaei؛ Hamidreza Navidi* | ||
| Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده | ||
| This study considers two agents, risk-neutral and risk-averse ones, and studies their investment behavior. There are two investment options-safe investments such as a bank account and a risky investment in a company. The company runs a risky project. In the case of success, its return is more than the bank’s, and that is less in the case of failure. When the project fails, the company divides the left amount among the investors based on the proportional bankruptcy rule. We model the problem as a strategic game and explore its Nash equilibrium. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| Investment game؛ Bankruptcy problem؛ Game theory؛ Risk-neutral؛ Risk-averse | ||
| مراجع | ||
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